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NOTE 
JOHNSON v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY 
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EXPANDED UNDER 
TITLE VII. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency/ 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a voluntary affirmative 
action plan that authorized consideration of an employee's sex 
as one factor in making a promotion determination. Although 
there was no evidence that the defendant, Santa Clara Trans-
portation Agency, had discriminated on the basis of sex in past 
or present promotion decisions,2 the Court found a "manifest 
imbalance reflecting under-representation of women in a tradi-
tionally segregated job category".! This statistical imbalance, ex-
plained the Court, justified the implementation of a temporary 
affirmative action plan.4 According to the Court, the plan neither 
trammeled the rights of male employees nor created an absolute 
bar to their advancement.6 The Court therefore held that the 
plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 
1. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
2. Id. at 1466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The District Court determined the Agency had 
not discriminated in the past nor was it presently discriminating against women. Addi-
tionally, there was no evidence that other employers had discriminated against women in 
similar fields. 
3. Id. at 1452-54. This "manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job cate-
gory" was based on 238 positions in the Skilled Craft job category. "As the Agency Plan 
recognized, women were most egregiously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job cate-
gory, since none of the 238 positions was occupied by a woman." Id. at 1454 (emphasis 
added). 
4. Id. at 1455. 
5.Id. 
6. Id. at 1457. See also § 703(a) of Title VII which provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
567 
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The issue of the legality of a gender-based voluntary affirm-
ative action plan implemented by a public employer under Title 
VII was one of first impression.7 Although the Court refused to 
set a rigid formula for testing the validity of such plans, it set 
forth a two-tiered analysis for determining whether an affirma-
tive action plan complied with the provisions of Title VIP 
This note discusses the guidelines established in Johnson. It 
will suggest that under the Johnson standards, general societal 
discrimination may provide a sufficient basis for imposing volun-
tary, sexually classified remedies under Title VIP It will further 
suggest that voluntary affirmative action in response to general 
societal discrimination is consistent with the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of Congress's intent in enacting Ti-
tle VIpo Finally, this note will evaluate the potential benefit the 
employer-
1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
7. John.~on, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1471 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia points out 
in his dissent, prior to Johnson, Title VII's effect on public employers remained un-
known; prior cases had dealt only with Title VII's effect on private employers. 
8. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452. The Court framed the first issue as whether affirma-
tive action was justified by a "manifest imbalance that reflected underrepresentation in a 
traditionally segregated job category". [d. at 1452. This inquiry, according to the Court, 
determines the sufficiency of the evidence, be it statistical or non-statistical. [d. The 
second issue considers the effect of a plan on males and non-minorities. [d. at 1455. 
Here, the court must determine whether innocent male and non-minority employees are 
being unduly burdened by the affirmative action plan.) [d. at 1455. 
9. Last term, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), the Court 
specifically held that general societal discrimination, as opposed to prior discrimination 
by an employer, was not a sufficient basis for allowing affirmative action under the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution. [d. at 1848. In Johnson, however, a constitutional 
claim was not raised; the only issue decided was that of the prohibitory scope of Title 
VII. [d. at 1446 n.2 (1987). 
10. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (Court described the goals 
of Title VII as being the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society). 
See also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1442 (1987). In Johnson, the Court stated "Our decision 
[in Weber) was grounded [on) the recognition that voluntary employer action can playa 
crucial role in furthering Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination 
in the workplace, and that Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts." [d. at 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/4
1988] JOHNSON 569 
Johnson decision brings to women's rights as well as noting the 
problems presented by the Court's failure to clearly delineate 
appropriate standards for affirmative action. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII 
During the 1960's, Congress became increasingly aware that 
black Americans were denied employment opportunities because 
of their race.ll Blacks suffered from higher rates of unemploy-
ment as well as from lower wages.12 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act),t3 with 
hopes of eradicating the racial prejudice and oppression facing 
blacks in their struggle for equal education and employment. a 
The Act prohibits private employers from discriminating against 
minorities, and seeks to open employment opportunities for mi-
norities in occupations which traditionally have been closed.lIi 
However, the legislative history of Title VII provides little 
insight into the Congressional intent behind the prohibition 
against sex discrimination. Added in a cynical attempt to ob-
struct passage of the entire bill, the sex discrimination provision 
received scant attention as it was enacted along with the original 
race discrimination provisions. l6 In an effort to provide equal 
1451. 
11. For a complete analysis of the legislative history of Title VII, see Vaas, Title 
VII: Legislatiue History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966). See also 109 CONGo 
REC. 3245 (1963) (including President Kennedy's Civil Rights Message to the 88th Con-
gress, which stresses that black unemployment in America was a problem that required 
immediate progress in three areas: creating more jobs through economic growth, raising 
skills through more education and training and eliminating racial discrimination in 
employment). 
12. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (citing remarks of Senators 
Kennedy and Humphrey). The senators report that, in 1962, black unemployment was 
124% higher than it had been in 1947. In addition, prior to 1964, blacks were largely 
relegated to unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982). 
14. Weber, 443 U.S. at 203. According to the Court, it was clear to Congress that 
"[t)he crux of the problem [was) to open employment opportunities for blacks in occupa-
tions which had been traditionally closed to them, and it was to this problem that Title 
VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment was primarily addressed." 
[d. 
15. [d. 
16. Vaas, supra note 11, at 441. According to Vaas, Representative Smith offered 
the provision prohibiting sex discrimination "in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery, in 
hopes that the addition would obstruct passage of the bill." [d. at 432. However, the 
3
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opportunity employment for women as well as minorities, Con-
gress amended the Civil Rights Act with the Equal Opportunity 
Act in 1972.17 The amendment also expanded Title VII coverage 
to include public as well as private employers. IS It increased the 
enforcement powers granted the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), and gave the commission a more ex-
pansive role in implementing Title VII policy. IS The EEOC in 
turn has fashioned many of the policies surrounding affirmative 
action under Title VII.20 
A. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court determined that Congress intended to 
prohibit employment practices that discriminate against any ar-
bitrary classification of employees.u Consequently, an employer 
entire bill passed with the sex discrimination provision intact. 
17. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2oo0e-
2(a) (1982). See also Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
NITY ACT OF 1972, 423 (1974) (purpose of the Act was to expand Title VII coverage). For 
a discussion of the legislative history of this amendment, see also 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 n.2 
(1985). This rule documents Congressional concern with higher unemployment rate, the 
lesser occupational status and the consequent lower income levels of minorities and 
women. This discussion also points out that Congress had become increasingly aware of 
women's concerns and had addressed these concerns in other legislation, including the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1963) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, Title 
VII, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §360 (1982), and the Educa-
tional Opportunity Act (Title IX), Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (1972), as amended. See 
also Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). In enacting 
the Equal Opportunity Act, Congress extended protection from discrimination to women 
as well as to minorities. [d. at 709. 
18. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). According to the Dothard Court, 
public employers were added to the definition of "employer" in Title VII in 1972 because 
"Congress expressly indicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to 
governmental and private employers alike." [d. at 332 n.14. See also McManis, Racial 
Discrimination in Government Employment: A Problem of Remedies for Unclean 
Hands, 63 GEO. L.J. 1203 (1975). McManis explains that prior to passage of the 1972 Act, 
various federal agencies had a track record of discriminating against minorities. [d. at 
1203. 
19. See 45A Am. Jur. 2d § 1159 (1986). The EEOC is the major federal agency con-
cerned with the elimination of job discrimination. Authorized by the provisions of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982), it is responsible for the administration and enforcement of 
Title VII through conciliation and negotiation. In 1972, Congress gave the EEOC power 
to litigate Title VII cases as well as carry out general rule-making power. 
20. F WEATHERSPOON. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(1985). 
21. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In McDonald, the 
Court held that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks from certain forms of racial 
4
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may face charges of unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII 
for discriminating against men in favor of women.22 However, 
many employers recognize that "mere prohibition of discrimina-
tory practices is not enough to remedy the effects of past prac-
tices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of 
minorities and women."23 In response to this concern, affirma-
tive action plans have been considered valid under Title VII.2' 
1. EEOC Interpretation of Congressional Intent 
In an effort to clarify the types of voluntary affirmative ac-
tion appropriate under Title VII, the EEOC established a set of 
guidelines in 1979.2~ The EEOC determined that Congress in-
tended to encourage voluntary action. It stated that "Congress 
did not intend to expose those who comply with the Act to 
charges that they are violating the very statute they are seeking 
to implement."28 
The EEOC guidelines advise employers to conduct a reason-
able self-analysis before implementing an affirmative action 
plan. It advised that employers should take care to observe ef-
fects of past employment practices due to their own discrimina-
tion as well as the discrimination of other persons or institu-
tions.27 However, the guidelines make it clear, that the self-
analysis need not establish a violation of Title VII to justify im-
plementing a reasonable affirmative action plan.28 According to 
the EEOC, voluntary affirmative action is appropriate under the 
following circumstances: where an adverse effect is unjustified 
by business necessity; where adverse effects are due to past or 
present discrimination; and where historic restrictions have lim-
discrimination. See also 45A Am. Jur. 2d § 196: "There is no separate concept of 'reverse 
discrimination' - the discrimination against a majority in favor of a minority - addressed 
by Title VII." 
22. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 284-85. 
23. See, e.g., Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1446 (the Court discusses why the County of 
Santa Clara thought affirmative action plans were necessary). 
24. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1442 
(1987). 
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (1985). 
26.Id. 
27.Id. 
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (1985). The rule's guidelines explain that a reasonable basis 
for implementing an affirmative action plan can exist without any admission or formal 
finding of employer discrimination or actual Title VII violations. 
5
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ited labor pools.29 
When a voluntary affirmative action plan conforms to the 
EEOC's guidelines, an employer's good faith reliance on the 
guidelines, protects it from a Title VII suit.80 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court determined that the EEOC's guidelines, findings 
and opinions are entitled to great deference.81 
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Affirmative Ac-
tion Under Title VII 
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret 
Title VII's effect on affirmative action in United Steelworkers 
v. Weber.82 The Court expressly rejected the argument that Ti-
tle VII absolutely prohibited private employers from voluntarily 
adopting race-conscious affirmative action plans.88 The Court ac-
knowledged that a literal construction of Title VII would appar-
ently bar any consideration of race in employment decisions. It 
determined that Title VII had to be examined in light of its leg-
islative history and the historical context from which the Act 
arose.84 The Court stated that the primary goal of Title VII was 
the integration of blacks into the economic mainstream.85 Ac-
cording to the Court, it was Congress's hope that Title VII 
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(a)-(c) (1985). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1982). See also 45A Am. Jur. 2d § 198 (1986). 
31. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See also Kanowitz, Sex-
Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1968). The author points out that "the 
Commission's investigations, findings and opinions are important, and under some cir-
cumstances attain the force of law." Id. at 318. 
32. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
33. "We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination 
does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans." Id. at 
208. 
34. Id. at 202. The Court points out that Title VII was intended to encourage volun-
tary efforts at eradicating segregation, not to place obstacles in the path of employers 
trying to achieve that end. Id. at 204. The court went on to explain that if Congress had 
wished to totally proscribe affirmative action, they would have done so; they would have 
stated that employers were not "required or permitted" to grant preference on the basis 
of race or sex. Id. at 206. Instead, the Act merely stated that employers were not "re-
quired" to grant preferences. Id. According to the Court, this language demonstrated the 
Congressional intent to encourage voluntary action on the part of employers. Id. at 205-
08. See also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (O'Connor J., concurring). In Johnson, Justice 
O'Connor points out that Section 703 has been interpreted by Weber and succeeding 
cases to permit what its language read literally would prohibit. 
35. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202. 
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would "create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local 
resolution of other forms of discrimination".36 After taking judi-
cial notice of numerous findings that blacks were excluded from 
craft unions on racial grounds,37 the Court looked at the statisti-
cal imbalance presented in the case.3S It determined that a race 
conscious plan designed to remedy the imbalance was consistent 
with Title VII's objective of "[breaking] down old patterns of 
racial segregation and hierarchy".39 
The Court found the plan legitimate because it did not dis-
charge any whites in order to hire blacks, nor did the plan create 
an absolute bar to the advancement of whites.40 In addition, the 
plan was a temporary measure not intended to maintain racial 
balance.41 These factors convinced the Court that the plan did 
not unnecessarily trammel the rights of the white employees.42 
The Court refused to define in detail a bright line of demar-
cation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action 
plans. However, it held that the Weber plan fell on the permissi-
ble side of the line.43 
36. [d. at 204 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 18 (1963». 
37. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1. The court determined that findings of exclusion 
from crafts on racial grounds were so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper sub-
ject for judicial notice. The court then cited over a dozen cases and articles supporting 
their conclusion. The significance of these finding has been the subject of heated debate. 
[d. See Comment, Walking a Tightrope without a Net: Voluntary Affirmative Action 
Plans After Weber, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1985). The author notes that by giving im-
port to the judicial notice of historical discrimination, it is possible to read Weber as 
requiring some showing of actual discrimination in the past. [d. at 466-67. 
38. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199 (39% of the general work force was black while only 
1.83 % of the skilled craftworkers were black). 
39. [d. at 208. See also (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 110 CONGo REC. 6552 (1964). 
[d. at 205. 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's con-
cern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve 
the lot of those who had 'been excluded from the American 
dream for so long' constituted the first legislative prohibition 
of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish 
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 
40. [d. at 208. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. at 208-09. 
43. [d. 
7
Marks: Johnson
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
574 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:567 
III. THE CASES LEADING TO JOHNSON v. 
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY 
Inherently conflicting concerns are raised in affirmative ac-
tion cases.·· As a result, the decisions of the Court are often 
markedly divided.·!! Nevertheless, the following standards have 
emerged. 
The Court consistently distinguishes plans implemented 
voluntarily from those plans imposed as judicial remedies for Ti-
tle VII violations. In Firefighters v. Cleveland,·6 the Court 
stated "We have on numerous occasions recognized that Con-
gress intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred 
means of achieving the objectives of Title VII."·7 In light of this 
recognition, the Court has determined that an employer's volun-
tary measures can be much broader than court enforced 
44. See Johnson 107 S. Ct. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgement). In 
Johnson, Justice O'Connor discussed the two conflicting concerns: Congressional intent 
to root out invidious discrimination against any person on the basis of race or gender 
and the Congressional goal of eliminating the lasting effects of discrimination against 
minorities. [d. at 1461. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 
(1986). The Court observed that a public employer operates under two interrelated con-
stitutional duties: To eliminate every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination and 
to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment by eliminating all governmentally imposed 
distinctions based on race. [d. at 1848. The Court recognized that these related constitu-
tional duties are not always harmonious. [d. These conflicting concerns were apparent 
from the time the Court first addressed affirmative action. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In DeFunis, Justice Brennan noted "Few 
constitutional questions in recent years have stirred as much debate .... " 
45. See Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (five Justice majority); Local 28 of the Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (only five Justices agreed to 
allow trial courts to order non-victim specific affirmative relief); Firefighters v. Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (only five Justices agreed that consent decrees were volun-
tary rather than court ordered remedies); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) (only five 
Justices agree with the Majority Opinion and a sixth Justice concurs with the judgement 
alone). See also Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). While five Justices 
(Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart and Stevens) held that the University's special ad-
missions plan which set aside sixteen places in each entering class of 100 for qualified 
minority applicants was unlawful under Title VI, five members of the Court would allow 
some racial or ethnic criteria to be considered in making decisions regarding admission 
to public higher education (Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White). 
See also, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78 (1980) (five Justices agreed that it 
was constitutional to set aside ten percent of the local public works projects for minority 
owned business). Although Bakke and Fulliloue did not deal with affirmative action 
under Title VII, they demonstrate the competing interests in any affirmative action case. 
46. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). 
47. [d. at 3072. 
8
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remedies.'s 
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. EEOC,'9 
the Court decided that non-victim specific affirmative relief can 
be ordered when an employer has engaged in persistent or egre-
gious discrimination or when affirmative relief is necessary to 
dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.lio 
However, beneficiaries of voluntary affirmative action need not 
be proven victims of actual discrimination. iiI 
The Court has also distinguished claims brought under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentli2 from 
those claims challenged on other grounds. To state a constitu-
tional claim, an employer must demonstrate some evidence of 
discrimination before it is justified in implementing a race con-
scious employment plan. liS In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educa-
.tion,Ii' the Court decided whether a layoff provision permitting 
the retention of minority teachers with less seniority and the fir-
ing of nonminority teachers violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.1i1i The Court concluded that general 
societal discrimination alone is not adequate justification for dis-
criminating against males and non-minorities.1i6 It held that the 
48. In Firefighters, the Court determined that consent decrees were to be viewed as 
voluntary measures and not as court enforced remedies. Their scope, therefore, could be 
broader than court enforced remedies. [d. at 3077. 
49. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). 
50. [d. at 3034. The Court went on to explain that the district court has broad au-
thority to "devise prospective relief designed to assure that employers found to be in 
violation of [Title VII) eliminate their discriminatory practices and the effects there-
from." [d. at 3048 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 364). See also Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. at 3072. The Court affirmed its determination that voluntary action 
available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination may include 
reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of 
discrimination.). 
51. [d. 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
53. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
54. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
55. [d. at 1845. 
56. [d. at 1848 (Powell,J., announcing the judgment of the court in an opinion 
joined by Burger and Rehnquist and in part by O'Connor). In Wygant, the Court stated: 
"No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as 
the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, 
societal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive." [d. at 1848. Wygant, however, 
involved a claim brought exclusively under the equal protection clause; Title VII was not 
addressed. 
9
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disparity between the percentage of minority students and the 
percentage of minority faculty presented in Wygant 67 was insuf-
ficient evidence of past discrimination, because "[t]here are nu-
merous explanations for a disparity between the percentage of 
minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many 
of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind."68 
However, the Court is reluctant to force employers to find 
that they have engaged in illegal discrimination in order to im-
plement voluntary affirmative action plans. IID In lieu of contem-
poraneous findings of discrimination, statistics may at times be 
considered important evidence of discrimination. As the Court 
explained in Teamsters v. United States,60 "[s]tatistics showing 
racial or ethnic imbalance are probative ... because such im-
balance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination".61 
The Court reasoned that over time, non-discriminatory hiring 
practices should result in a more or less balanced work force. 62 
Prior to Johnson, it was unresolved whether statistics alone, 
without any other evidence of employer discrimination, would 
justify a public employer's implementation of an affirmative ac-
tion plan under Title VII. 63 
IV. JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY 
A. THE TRANSPORTATION AGENCY'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN 
Pursuant to a county-wide affirmative action plan, the 
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara (Agency) adopted its own 
affirmative action plan in 1978.64 The Agency reviewed the com-
57. [d. at 1842. 
58. [d. at 1848. 
59. [d. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement). 
Justice O'Connor explains that to demand contemporaneous findings would undermine 
public employers' incentive to voluntarily meet their civil rights obligations: "employers 
are trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action 
is not taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to nonminori-
ties if affirmative action is taken." [d. at 1855. 
60. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
61. [d. at 340 n.20. 
62. [d. 
63. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1471. 
64. [d. at 1446. See also Respondent's Brief at 5-6, Johnson (county-wide plan was 
intended to apply to all agencies of county government; Agency's plan was tailored, how-
ever, to meet the needs of the Transportation Agency). 
10
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position of its workforce and found that women were under-
represented.sli While women composed 36.4% of the area labor 
market, only 22.4% of the Agency's employees were women.ss It 
also found that the women employees were concentrated in job 
categories traditionally held by women, especially in the office 
and clerical positions.s7 
As a result of such findings, the Agency's plan authorized 
consideration of sex as one factor in making promotions to posi-
tions where women were significantly underrepresented. S8 The 
Agency recognized that "mere prohibition of discriminatory 
practices was not enough to remedy the effects of past practices 
and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of mi-
norities, women and handicapped persons."S9 
The Agency's long term goal was to attain a work force 
whose composition reflected the corresponding proportions of 
minorities and women in the area labor force. 7o However, they 
acknowledged that the following factors would make this long 
term goal unrealistic: the low turnover rates in some job classifi-
cations; the heavy labor required by some jobs; the scarcity of 
positions available within some job categories; the limited num-
ber of entry positions leading to the Technical and Skilled Craft 
classifications; and the limited number of minorities and women 
qualified for positions requiring specialized training and 
experience.71 
Consequently, the Agency advised that short-range goals be 
established and annually adjusted to serve as benchmarks for 
65. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1446. 
66.Id. 
67. Id. Women made up 76% of the office and clerical workers, but only 7.1 % of 
agency officials and administrators, 8.6% of professionals, 9.7% of technicians and 22% 
of service and maintenance workers. In addition, not one of the 238 skilled craft worker 
positions was held by a woman. Id. at 1446. 
68. Id. at 1447. 
69. Id. The Agency also noted that this underrepresentation reflected the fact that 
women had not traditionally been employed in these positions, and that they had not 
been strongly motivated to seek training or employment in them because of the limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past. Id. at 1446. 
The Plan applied to women, minorities and handicapped persons, but since Johnson 
dealt with gender discrimination, this article addresses the plan only within that context. 
70. Id. at 1456. 
71. Id. at 1447. 
11
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actual employment decisions.72 The Plan did not set aside a spe-
cific number of positions for women.78 Instead, it authorized 
consideration of sex as one factor in making an employment 
decision.7 ' 
B. THE AGENCY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
PLAN 
On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for 
the road dispatcher position.7Ci Twelve county employees applied 
for the promotion, including the plaintiff Paul Johnson and a 
female employee Diane Joyce.78 Johnson and Joyce were highly 
experienced road workers and both were deemed qualified for 
the job.77 Of the twelve applicants, seven were eligible for the 
job; the Agency Director was authorized to choose anyone of 
these seven.78 After considering a variety of factors, including 
qualifications, test-scores, expertise, background and affirmative 
action, the Director ultimately hired Diane Joyce.79 
Johnson filed suit alleging that he had been the victim of 
unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.80 The dis-
trict court found that Johnson was more qualified for the road 
dispatcher position and that Joyce's gender had been the deter-
mining factor in her selection.s1 It then held that the plan was 
invalid because it did not satisfy Weber's requirement that the 
72. [d. The Agency recognized that in order to establish short-term goals, further 
data was needed reflecting ratios of qualified women in the local labor force. [d. at 1447. 
At the time Joyce was hired, these statistics had not yet been compiled. 
73. [d. at 1447. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. Johnson had previous Dispatch experience, two years of road maintenance 
experience and 11 years of Road Yard Clerk experience; he scored 75 on his interview. 
Joyce had 18 years of past clerical experience and almost five years as a road mainte-
nance worker; in her capacity as road maintenance worker, she occasionally worked out 
of class as a road dispatcher; she scored 73 on her interview. Both candidates had been 
recommended for promotion by Agency supervisors, and evaluation forms had deemed 
both applicants well-qualified. [d. at 1447-49. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at 1448. 
80. [d. at 1449. Petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California. 
81. [d. at 1449. 
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plan be temporary.82 
In reversing the trial court, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
absence of an express termination date in the plan was not dis-
positive.8s The plan's objective was the "attainment" rather than 
the "maintenance" of a work force that mirrored the county la-
bor force.8• This convinced the court of the plan's temporary na-
ture.8& The court also explained that an employer need not show 
any history of purposeful discriminatory patterns or practices; it 
is sufficient for an employer to show a conspicuous imbalance in 
its work force.8s 
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that Weber must 
guide the evaluation of any voluntary affirmative action plan 
under Title 11.87 The Court asked two questions in determining 
whether an affirmative action plan was justified. First, was there 
a "'manifest imbalance' that reflected under-representation of 
women in a 'traditionally segregated job category'?"88 The Court 
explained that where a job requires special training, the proper 
82. [d. The district court acknowledged that it was bound by Weber since the 
Agency had justified its decision on the basis of its affirmative action plan. [d. at 1449. 
The court explained how justification of a gender based decision based on affirmative 
action served to shift the burden of proof. [d. at 1449. By convincing the district court 
that the promotion decision had been based solely on gender, petitioner Johnson estab-
lished a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. [d. at 1449. The burden 
of proof, therefore, shifted to the Agency to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for 
its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provided such a rational. The 
burden then shifted back to petitioner to prove the employer's justification pretextual 
and the plan invalid. [d. at 1449. The petitioner met his burden, according to the district 
court, by proving that the Plan did not meet the Weber criteria that an affirmative ac-
tion plan be temporary. [d. at 1449. 
83. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 770 F.2d 752, 757 (1985). 
84. [d. at 756. 
85. [d. The court noted that the imposition of rigorous drafting technicalities would 
discourage adoption of voluntary plans and at the same time encourage litigation. [d. at 
757. 
86. [d. The court explained that statistics alone were useful to show conspicuous 
work force imbalances: "We note particularly the difficulty that may confront an em-
ployer whose plan is intended to remedy discrimination resulting from societal norms. 
Some forms of discrimination are so subtle or so accepted as to defy proof other than by 
statistics." [d. at 758. 
87. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449. See also supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Weber. 
88. [d. at 1452. 
13
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statistical comparison is between the number of women in an 
employer's work force and the number in the area labor force 
who possess the relevant skills and qualifications.89 If a conspic-
uous statistical imbalance indicates that women are dispropor-
tionately underrepresented in the employer's work force, an em-
ployer may voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan even 
without a non-statistical finding of discrimination.90 According 
to the Court, this comparison differs from a "prima facie" stan-
dard which is concerned solely with past discrimination by an 
employer.91 
Since the road dispatcher position demanded considerable 
skills, the Agency was required to compare the number of 
women they employed in that category to the number in the lo-
cal labor force possessing similar skills and qualifications.92 
However, the Agency was still in the process of refining its short 
term goals and compiling the relevant statistics at the time the 
job became available.93 Because the plan was incomplete, the 
only available statistics compared the women employed by the 
Agency to all women in the local labor force. 9• However, the 
89. [d. at 1454. See also H82elwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 
(1977). In Hazelwood, the court explained that because teaching jobs require certain spe-
cific skills, the proper comparison for determining the existence of discrimination must 
be between the percentage of employed blacks and the percentage of qualified blacks in 
the area labor force. But see Johnson 107 S. Ct. at 1454, in which the Court noted that 
for jobs requiring no special skills, the relevant statistics compare the percentage of 
women in the employer's work force with the percentage of women in the local labor 
pool. [d. at 1454. Thus, in Weber it was appropriate to compare the employer's minority 
workforce with the local minority labor force. [d. at 1454. 
90. "As long as there is a manifest imbalance, an employer may adopt a plan even 
where the disparity is not so striking, without being required to introduce the non-statis-
tical evidence of past discrimination that would be demanded by the prima facie stan-
dard." [d. at 1453 n.ll. This is, however, only the first of a two-tiered inquiry; it must 
also be demonstrated that the plan does not unduly burden other non-minority employ-
ees. [d. at 1452. 
91. "A manifest imbalance need not be such that it would support a prima facie case 
against the employer .... " [d. at 1452. The Court points out that the Weber Court did 
not use the "prima facie" standard; had it done so, the plaintiff would have been re-
quired to compare the percentage of black skilled workers in the work force with the 
percentage of black skilled workers in the area labor force, a standard that would have 
invalidated the plan in Weber. [d. at 1452-53 n.1O. 
92. [d. The Court explained that had the Plan compared its employees to a general 
labor pool, its validity could have been called into question. A more specialized labor 
pool is necessary when determining underrepresentation in skilled job categories. [d. at 
1454. 
93. [d. at 1454. 
94. [d. 
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Agency instructed their managers not to hire or make promotion 
decisions solely by reference to the statistics.911 Rather, the su-
pervisors making the actual employment decisions were advised 
to consider a host of practical factors. One factor was that in 
some job categories women were not qualified in numbers com-
parable to their representation in the labor force.96 
The Court acknowledged the "limited opportunities that 
have existed in the past in certain job classifications where 
women have not been traditionally employed".97 It focused on 
the fact that there were no women employed in the skilled craft 
category at the time of Joyce's promotion. The Court recognized 
that as a practical matter, the Agency hardly needed to rely on a 
refined short term goal to realize that it had a significant prob-
lem of underrepresentation.98 Under such facts, the Court was 
satisfied that there was a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally 
segregated job category sufficient to warrant the voluntary im-
plementation of affirmative action.99 
The Court next inquired into the actual nature of the plan. 
It applied the Weberloo criteria to determine whether the plan 
unnecessarily trammeled upon or created an absolute bar to the 
advancement of male employees.lol The Agency's plan met the 
Weber criteria. lo2 The plan set aside no positions for women, nor 
did it automatically exclude anyone; all applicants had their 
qualifications weighed against all other applicants. lOS No one lost 
95. [d. at 1455. 
96. [d. The Agency, therefore, did recognize that the proper statistics for compari-
son would have to compare the women employed with the qualified women in the local 
labor force. Additionally, the Plan emphasized that the long-term goal of attaining a 
balanced workforce was not to be taken as a guide for actual hiring decisions. [d. at 1454. 
97. [d. at 1453 n.12 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Johnson). The court 
found "A plethora of proof is hardly necessary to show that women are generally under-
represented in such positions and that strong social pressures weigh against their 
participation ... 
98. [d. Of the 238 positions in the Skilled Craft category of road dispatcher, no 
women were employed. [d. at 1454. 
99. [d. at 1455. 
100. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
101. The affirmative action plan in Weber was satisfactory because it did not re-
quire discharge of whites, it did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of whites 
and it was a temporary measure. [d. at 208. 
102. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1457. 
103. See Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Johnson plan was, 
rather, akin to a model affirmative action plan approved by the Court in Bakke. The 
15
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their job due to the promotion of another and all applicants 
maintained their seniority and eligibility for future promo-
tions. l04 
Finally, the Court addressed the issue that caused the dis-
trict court to strike down the plan: the requirement that the 
plan be temporary. 1011 Although the plan contained no explicit 
termination date, the Court found that the plan was acceptable 
because it was designed to take a moderate and gradual ap-
proach to eliminating the imbalance in the work force. lOS The 
gradual approach, as well as the Agency's express commitment 
to "attaining" a balanced work force, convinced the Court that 
the Agency did not intend to use its plan to maintain a perma-
nent sexual balance.l07 
D. CONCURRENCES 
1. Justice Stevens 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized that 
the majority did not foreclose other voluntary programs under-
taken by employers to benefit disadvantaged groups. lOS Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, there are many legitimate reasons for giv-
ing preferences to underrepresented groups. These include 
providing role-models, improving minority relations and increas-
ing diversity in the work force. l09 Justice Stevens believes it 
would be more helpful for an employer to focus on the future 
rather than scrutinizing the past. no 
"Harvard Plan", approved of in Bakke, considered race along with other criteria in de-
termining admission to the university. Race would not be the only factor considered in 
the admission process but it would be deemed a 'plus'. [d. at 316-19. 
104. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456. In fact, when an additional road dispatcher posi-
tion was created in 1983, it was awarded to petitioner Johnson. 
105. [d. at 1456. See also Weber, 443 U.s. at 209. 
106. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 1460. 
109. [d. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272 (Powell, J., for plurality). In Bakke, Justice 
Powell pointed out that achieving diversity in the student body was a "compelling inter-
est, appropriately served by race-conscious measures". [d. at 272. See also, Sullivan, The 
Supreme Court - Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmatiue Action 
Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78 (1986). 
110. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1460. 
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2. Justice O'Connor 
According to Justice O'Connor, public entities initiating vol-
untary affirmative action plans "must point to evidence suffi-
cient to establish a firm basis for believing that remedial action 
is required, and that a statistical imbalance sufficient for a 
prima facie Title VII case against the employer would satisfy 
this firm basis requirement."1l1 Under the facts of Johnson, Jus-
tice O'Connor found that the statistical disparity would have 
been sufficient for a prima facie Title VII case brought by un-
successful women job applicants. ll2 Persuaded by the peti-
tioner's concession that women constituted five percent of the 
local pool of skilled workers and that the Agency employed no 
women in this category, Justice O'Conner was satisfied that 
there was a firm basis for implementing affirmative action. lls 
E. DISSENTS 
1. Justice Scalia, Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
Absent findings of conscious, exclusionary discrimination, 
Justice Scalia does not approve of affirmative action under Title 
VII or the Constitution. ll4 The statistics presented in Johnson, 
according to Justice Scalia, were caused by nothing more than 
"longstanding social attitudes" which caused women themselves 
to regard such work as undesirable.11& Consequently, such find-
ings of general societal discrimination were insufficient grounds 
for implementing affirmative action. ll6 
111. [d. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Conner stated "[T)he proper 
initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action plan by a public em-
ployer under Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal Protection 
Clause." [d. at 1461. 
112. [d. at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
113. [d. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was persuaded by the fact that 
the petitioner in Johnson had conceded that women constituted approximately 5% of 
the local labor pool of skilled craft workers in 1970 and by the additional fact that there 
was not a single woman employed in this category. [d. at 1464. 
114. [d. at 1471. 
115. [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated "It is absurd to think that the 
nation-wide failure of road maintenance crews [to achieve female representation) is at-
tributable ... to the systematic exclusion of women eager to shoulder pick and shovel." 
[d. at 1471. 
116. [d. at 1469. 
17
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Rather than try to distinguish Johnson, Justice Scalia 
would prefer to take the opportunity to overrule Weber1l7 com-
pletely, stare decisis notwithstanding.1l8 According to Justice 
Scalia, the majority has "not merely repealed but actually in-
verted [Title VII]."119 
2. Justice White 
According to Justice White, Weber approved of affirmative 
action only when it was designed to remedy intentional and sys-
tematic exclusion of blacks by employers from certain job cate-
gories.no Justice White read the majority's interpretation of 
Weber as requiring nothing more than an imbalanced workforce 
as a prerequisite for affirmative action. Since his understanding 
was at odds with Jhe majority's, he too would overrule Weber.121 
V. CRITIQUE 
Johnson is an important decision for women for several rea-
sons. Although women as a group are currently working outside 
the home in ever increasing numbers, they earn less money than 
men and remain segregated in the traditionally female occupa-
tions.122 Recent studies confirm that affirmative action is an ef-
fective and necessary tool for women to achieve equal oppor-
tunity in employment.123 Gender-conscious affirmative action 
117. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
118. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1472 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted "It is 
well to keep in mind just how thoroughly Weber rewrote the statute it purported to 
construe." 
119. [d. at 1476. 
120. [d. at 1465. 
121. [d. 
122. See BUREAU U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. TIME OF CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON 
WOMEN WORKERS (1983) (women remain clustered in predominantly "female" occupa· 
tions such as clerical workers, service workers, health workers and school teachers). See 
also WOMEN'S BUREAU. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR 
WOMEN, 1976·1985: EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1985). In 1985, a woman aged 25 
or over with four or more years of college who was working full·time earned 64% of the 
salary of a similarly situated man. For a discussion of gender equality and biological 
differences between men and women, see Comment, Law, Rethinking Sex and the Con· 
stitution, 132 U. PA. REV. 955 (1984). 
123. Brief Amici Curiae for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund at 56·57, 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). A 1983 study comparing con· 
tractor and noncontractor establishments, found that affirmative action has been suc· 
cessful in promoting the employment of minorities and females. See also J. LEONARD, 
18
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enables women to gain access to jobs from which they have been 
previously excluded. 124 
The Johnson decision also serves as additional evidence to 
interested women that non-traditional jobs are an option. Once 
provided with female role models in non traditional jobs, women 
become aware of opportunities that they never knew existed.1211 
When nontraditional occupations are opened to them, women 
respond by moving into the new occupations.126 Gender-con-
scious measures such as the Transportation Agency's are there-
fore necessary to ensure that more occupations do become avail-
able to women. 
This decision has potentially far reaching effects for women 
because it encourages employers to affirmatively recruit, hire, 
and promote qualified women.127 Absent the need for rigorous 
findings of past or present discrimination, employers are given 
more freedom to initiate affirmative action programs based on a 
recognition that a problem exists as demonstrated by a "mani-
fest imbalance" in their work force. Thus, Title VII's goal of en-
couraging voluntary action and promoting integration of women 
into the work force will be better served. 
THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1983). Leonard found that the "affirmative action 
goal is the single best predictor of subsequent employment demographics." [d. at 25. In 
1984, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs released a study which 
reached the same conclusion. OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, EM-
PLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-CON-
TRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS, 1974-1980 (1984). 
124. In 1973 there were no women coal miners; by 1980, as a result of affirmative 
action, 3,295 women had become coal miners. Similarly, the numbers of women workers 
increased dramatically when the Maritime Administration required shipbuilding contrac-
tors to establish goals and timetables for hiring more women. In addition, it was found 
that as more women were hired, more women applied for positions. See Examination on 
Issues Affecting Women in Our Nation's Labor Force: Hearings Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1981). 
125. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1455 n.14. The Court noted that the Agency was mindful of 
the importance of finally hiring a woman in a job category that had formerly been all 
male; it recognized that philosophically it would encourage women to actively seek out 
these non-traditional jobs. See also Brief Amici Curiae for NOW Legal Defense and Ed-
ucation Fund at 57-58, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
126. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, "A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO ApPREN-
TICESHIP" (1980). See also Hearings, supra note 124 (contractors found that as more 
women were hired, more applied). 
127. See Brief Amici Curiae for NOW Legal Defense Fund at 61, Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
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Unfortunately, the benefits of this decision are jeopardized 
by the Court's less than unequivocal mandate. Although the 
Court distinguishes the "manifest imbalance" standard from the 
"prima facie" standard in the area of unskilled jobs,128 where a 
job requires skill, the operative differences between the two 
standards remain unclear. 
The Johnson majority demands less of a statistical imbal-
ance than that necessary for a prima facie case of discrimination 
against women, but the Court does not clearly define this alter-
native standard.I29 Moreover, the manifest imbalance standard 
requires the same comparisons in job categories requiring skill as 
does the prima facie standard.lso 
While it is encouraging that the Court appears to be more 
concerned with present statistical imbalances as opposed to in-
tentional past conduct, this concern is not articulated. lSI The 
net effect is that little guidance has been given and there is dan-
ger of confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts. Due to 
the controversial nature of affirmative action, some lower courts 
seem unwilling to abandon the requirement of a showing of ac-
tual discrimination without a more exacting mandate from the 
Supreme Court. In Hammmon v. Barry,1S2 for example, the 
court demanded evidence of past discrimination as a prerequi-
site to making lawful race-conscious employment decisions. ISS 
128. Johnson, lO7 S. Ct. 1442, 1452 n.10. 
129. [d. at 1453 n.11. The Court stated that "As long as there is a manifest imbal-
ance, an employer may adopt a plan even where the disparity is not so striking, without 
being required to introduce the non-statistical evidence of past discrimination that 
would be demanded by the "prima facie" standard." But see [d. at 1462 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). Justice O'Connor points out that an employer need not point to any con-
temporaneous findings of actual discrimination; rather, a statistical imbalance sufficient 
for a Title VII prima facie case against the employer would provide a firm basis for 
believing that remedial action is required. [d. at 1462. 
130. [d. at 1452. 
131. Only Justice Stevens, in concurrence, suggests an alternative focus away from 
the past and into the future. [d. at 1460. 
132. 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
133. In Hammon, the court determined that the 'predicate of discrimination' re-
quirement had not been eliminated by Johnson. [d. at 80. But see Higgins v. City of 
Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the Ninth Circuit followed a broad interpre-
tation of Johnson and upheld an affirmative action plan based on statistics alone. [d. at 
356. See also Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1987); Janowiak 
v. City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987); Michigan Road Builders Assoc. v. 
Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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These factors make the future of Johnson uncertain. The 
Court may be forced to address affirmative action under Title 
VII again in the near future, but recent changes on the Court 
make it difficult to predict how expansively Johnson will be 
read.134 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court does not exist in a vacuum. It must follow both 
the letter and the spirit of the law.13& The Supreme Court and 
the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission have inter-
preted the purpose of Title VII as one of integrating women and 
minorities into the work force and of encouraging voluntary ac-
tion to achieve this goal. Since Weber was decided in 1979, Con-
gress has had an open invitation to legislate in this area if it felt 
its intent had been misperceived. It has remained silent. ISS 
For the present, the Johnson Court has expanded an em-
ployer's ability to implement voluntary affirmative action plans. 
In doing so, it has moved women and men a step closer toward 
the day when, as a balanced society, our judiciary no longer need 
concern itself with benign discrimination. 
Theresa Marks* 
134. On Feb. 18, 1988, Judge Anthony Kennedy was sworn in as the nation's 104th 
member of the Supreme Court. Although some Democratic Senators expressed concerns 
about his sensitivity to women's and minority rights, he was unanimously confirmed by 
the Senate. See San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1988 at A-I, col. 2. 
There are presently only four Justices who would allow voluntary affirmative action 
under Title VII to remedy a "manifest imbalance" (Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackman and Stevens). In addition, there are three Justices who would overrule both 
Johnson and Weber (Justices Scalia, White and Rehnquist). While Justice O'Connor 
would not overrule Weber, she would demand a firm basis for concluding that there has 
been past or present discrimination. 
135. 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 459 (1892». In Holy Trinity, the Court noted it is a "familiar rule, that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within its spirit, nor within the inten-
tion of its makers." 
136. Weber, 443 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated "If 
the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the ques-
tion is statutory, Congress may set a different course if it so chooses." [d. at 216. Justice 
Blackmun was quoted approvingly in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450-51 n.7. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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